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AMERICA'S PREPAREDNESS AGAINST JAPAN

By K. K. KAWAKAMI

SINCE the Wilson administration announced its stupendous defense programme, advocates of preparedness have been harping upon the popular notion of the "Japanese Peril." They have been telling us that the Mikado has a navy powerful enough to attack the United States, once he makes up his mind to pick a quarrel with Uncle Sam. Let us see how true such a statement is.

At present Japan's naval fleet consists of six dreadnoughts, including two now under construction; four battle cruisers, thirteen battleships of the pre-dreadnought type, four cruisers, fifty destroyers, and seventeen submarines. All told, Japan's warships aggregate 560,484 tons.

As against this strength, America has a fleet totaling 1,271,117 tons, i. e., 710,633 tons more than the Japanese squadron. To enter into details, the American navy, as it stands today, consists of nineteen dreadnoughts (including the two now under construction and known simply as No. 43 and No. 44), twenty-three battleships of the pre-dreadnought type, 10 cruisers, 63 destroyers, 51 submarines, and 22 colliers.

The face of these figures shows that the Japanese navy has about one-half the strength of the American navy. But when we study the nature of the ships on both sides the inferiority of the Japanese fleet becomes all the more obvious. In the first place, the American dreadnoughts are much larger than the Japanese. Of the American fleet the 7 largest dreadnoughts have each a displacement of 32,500 tons, while the 4 largest Japanese dreadnoughts are of a displacement of 30,600 tons each.

Again, as against 6 American dreadnoughts of 27,500 tons each, Japan has only 4 battle cruisers of the same size. The remaining 2 dreadnoughts of Japan are of a displacement of 20,800 tons each, whereas the United States has 2 dreadnoughts of 27,343 tons each, 2 of 21,825 tons each, 2 of 20,000 tons each, and 2 of 16,000 tons each.

In the second place, the American dreadnoughts are equipped with larger numbers of more powerful guns than are the Japanese. Of 19 American dreadnoughts, 7 are equipped with twelve 14-inch guns, 4 with ten 14-inch guns, 2 with twelve 12-inch guns, 4 with ten 12-inch guns, and 2 with eight 12-inch guns. On the Japanese side there is not a single dreadnought equipped with so many as twelve 14-inch guns. To be more accurate, of 6 Japanese dreadnoughts 4 have only ten 14-inch guns, while 2 are equipped with twelve 12-inch guns. The Japanese battle cruisers, 4 in all, have each only eight 14-inch guns.

In the third place, Japan has 13 battleships of the pre-dreadnought type totaling 193,666 tons, while the United States has 23, with a total displacement of 314,906 tons. Here it is important to note that only 2 of 13 Japanese battleships are fit to stand on the first line of battle, as against 6 of America's.

In the fourth place, America has 62 destroyers, as against Japan's 50. On the face of the figures the difference does not seem very great, but we must remember that most American destroyers are over 800 tons, and therefore seagoing, while the Japanese navy has only 6

destroyers above 800 tons. Most Japanese destroyers are not seagoing, but are for coast defense. Thus 62 American destroyers have a total tonnage of 73,097, while 50 Japanese destroyers aggregate only 36,118 tons.

In the fifth place, Japan has only 17 submarines, as against America's 51. Here, too, most American submarines are of a larger type and seagoing, while Japan's are not.

In the sixth place, the American navy has 22 colliers, aggregating 236,401 tons, while Japan has none. In a naval expedition to distant waters the collier is as important as the fighting craft. The Japanese navy, being primarily intended to protect Chinese and Japanese waters within easy reach from its bases of operation, has made no such elaborate provision for supplying the warships with fuel as has been made by the American navy. In case of emergency, Japan requisitions merchant ships for colliers, which is, of course, very unsatisfactory as compared with the American method.

This, in brief, is the relative strength of Japan and the United States at present. It is evident that the American navy in its existing condition is almost three times as powerful as the Japanese navy, provided, of course, that the Panama Canal will ensure the safe passage of the Atlantic fleet to the Pacific.

I have shown that the existing naval strength of Japan is about one-third that of the United States. And yet this is the fleet which has been constantly held up by certain publicists as a menace to the Pacific coast of America. These men have never stopped to think how many colliers and transports Japan will have to have in order to send an expedition across the Pacific to a point 5,700 miles away. They do not know, or pretend not to know, the almost insurmountable difficulty of guarding transports against the enemy's attack on such a long voyage. During the Russo-Japanese war Japan had a fleet of warships protecting the six transports in carrying troops and ammunition across the Straits of Korea, only 80 miles wide. And yet three Russian cruisers managed to escape our vigilance and destroyed most of our transports.

Now the question is whether Japan is building warships faster than the United States. Japan has never been building warships on so extensive a scale as the powers of Europe and America. As early as October 19, 1903, the United States adopted a naval programme in pursuance of which she was to build 34 battleships before 1920. By 1907 the American navy was twice as powerful as the Japanese, and by 1910 it had become almost three times as powerful as the Japanese navy, because in the preceding two years the United States launched six dreadnoughts, while Japan launched only three.

In Europe, Germany adopted a naval repletion programme in 1907, Russia in 1911, France in 1912, Italy in 1910, and Austria in 1912. In the meantime Japan had no definite naval programme to follow, and was lagging behind the western powers in the matter of naval preparation. When at last she followed the example of Europe and America and adopted a plan last September, it was only on a very small scale.

This new Japanese programme calls for the construction, in the five years from 1917 to 1921, of 4 dreadnoughts, 6 cruisers, 10 destroyers, and 9 submarines. This requires an expenditure of \$95,000,000 in five yearly installments.

Compare this with the great naval programme recommended by Secretary Daniels, and you will see how modest the Japanese plan is. The American programme calls for the building of 10 battleships, 6 battle cruisers, 10 scout cruisers, 50 destroyers, 15 seagoing submarines, 85 coast defense submarines, 4 gunboats, 1 hospital ship, 2 ammunition ships, 2 fuel-oil ships, and 1 repair ship. This entails an expenditure of \$422,964,087 in the five years from 1917 to 1921—that is to say, four times the sum required by the Japanese plan.

This enormous expenditure provided for in the American programme is only for the ships to be built hereafter. To it we must add \$48,518,127 for the completion of the dreadnoughts now under construction, \$6,000,000 for naval aviation, and \$25,000,000 for reserve ammunition. All in all, the five years' programme calls for an expenditure of \$502,482,214.

Presuming that both the Japanese and American programmes were carried out as they have been formulated, the relative strength of the navies of the two countries at the end of 1921 will be as follows:

The Japanese Navy.—Eight dreadnoughts, 4 battle cruisers, 15 battleships of the pre-dreadnought type, 10 cruisers, 60 destroyers, 27 submarines.

The American Navy.—Twenty-seven dreadnoughts, 6 battle cruisers, 25 battleships of the pre-dreadnought type, 20 cruisers, 112 destroyers, 151 submarines, 24 colliers.

A glance at this summary reveals that the American armada will be about three times as powerful as the Japanese squadron. But the figures are misleading.

When we consider that the American ships are equipped with a larger number of more powerful guns than are the Japanese vessels, that most of the American destroyers and submarines are seagoing, that the American navy is better supplied with fuel ships and other auxiliary ships—when we consider all these conditions, it would seem that the American navy would have almost four times the strength of the Japanese navy by the end of 1921.

But what would be the comparative strength of the American navy should Congress reject the administrative naval measure, while Japan pursued the programme which she has adopted?

In that case America will undoubtedly follow the principle laid down in the programme of October 19, 1903, and repeatedly emphasized by Mr. Roosevelt and Ex-Secretary of Navy Meyer. The result would be that by 1921 the American navy would have twice the strength of the Japanese navy, instead of four times, as is expected from the adoption of Secretary Daniels' programme.

Those who fear, or pretend to fear Japan's "navalism" point to the Anglo-Japanese alliance and warn that, in the event of rupture between Japan and the United States, Great Britain would throw the whole weight of her great navy on the Japanese side of the scale. These wiseacres are ignorant that Great Britain has entered into a general arbitration treaty with this country, and that the Anglo-Japanese alliance contains the following provision: "Should either high contracting party conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a third power, it is agreed that nothing in this agreement shall entail upon such contracting party an obligation to go to war with the power with whom such treaty of arbitration is in force."

MILITARY TRAINING IN CALIFORNIA SCHOOLS

By ROBERT C. ROOT

PACIFIC COAST DIRECTOR OF AMERICAN PEACE SOCIETY.

THE State of California has at the present time 279 high schools. Of this number twelve have organized cadet companies of not less than forty pupils in each company, as authorized by State law. Several high schools have two or three cadet companies, since there are all told twenty-five military companies in the twelve high schools and 1,300 boys, fourteen years and upwards, taking military drill.

The total enrollment of boys and girls in the high schools of the State is 76,429. The boys alone number less than half, or 36,218, and 1,300 of these boys are in the cadet drill companies.

It is the belief of the writer that the teachers of California, as a class, are more nearly "100% pure" on the peace question than any other class of people in the State. Numbers of high-school principals and teachers are strongly opposed to military drill in their schools. Still, it is probable that there would be more military cadet companies in the high schools of California if more of these schools had a sufficient number of boys

(40 or more) to organize a drill company. The seven or eight private military schools of the State may, in some sense, supply the so-called "need" in this respect.

The twelve schools having military drill among their students have nearly or quite 8,000 pupils; hence the total number in the military companies is slightly less than one-sixth of the whole enrollment, or about one-twelfth of the number of boys enrolled. In one school nearly one-half of the boys are in the military companies, while in another larger school one boy in fifteen or more takes military drill. The captain of one company in this school—the Oakland Technical High School—told me it required much work to keep up the interest in the military companies. They were formed within the last year.

The provision for military drill in the high schools is found in three enactments of the California State legislature. The first act was approved April 5, 1911, and provides that "High Schools May Establish Military Companies;" provides for the organization and equip-